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ABSTRACT. We aimed to uncover the origin of ambiguity in flood infrastructure projects using Building with Nature (BwN) design
principles. BwN is a new approach in flood management that simultaneously integrates societal goals, such as flood safety and recreation
development, with nature development goals by actively using natural dynamics and materials in the project’s design. Because BwN
projects affect multiple stakeholders and several societal functions, participatory project development is of key importance to successfully
implement these projects. In such a multiactor decision-making process, a diversity of actors are involved, all of whom have their own
view of the project based on their interests, values, beliefs, backgrounds, and past experiences. As a consequence, BwN projects are
susceptible to being hampered by the presence of ambiguity, a kind of uncertainty that results from the simultaneous presence of
multiple frames. For two BwN case study projects, we identified where the ambiguities potentially affecting project development resided,
derived the different actor frames, and addressed the attributes underlying these frames. Our main finding was that ambiguity in BwN
projects seems to originate from a contradiction between the beliefs held by different actors. Furthermore, our results suggest that in
the current practice of BwN projects the scientific knowledge of experts is perceived as more legitimate than the local knowledge and
experiences of lay actors, which implies that experts have a more powerful position in multiactor decision making. Thus, our research
underlines the difficulty of bringing local knowledge and past experiences of lay actors into collective decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
Water systems have always challenged human communities
because the threat of flooding has never been far from society’s
doorstep. In the 20th century, flood infrastructure was dominated
by rigid structures such as dikes, dams, and storm surge barriers,
which are intended to strictly regulate and control water systems.
Although the application of rigid structures to prevent flooding
has been a success in the recent past, the negative impact of such
strategies on ecosystems and natural processes is often not
properly taken into account in flood management (Richter et al.
2003). Over the years, there has been a growing emphasis on
incorporating ecological values in water policy (Gleick 2000). This
is reflected in water management, where the paradigm is slowly
changing toward more nature-inclusive approaches (Pahl-Wostl
et al. 2011). Building with Nature (BwN) is a new approach of
nature-inclusive flood management in the Netherlands. Instead
of using the described rigid structures, which intend to strictly
regulate and control water systems, BwN design principles aim
to utilize natural dynamics, e.g., wind and currents, and natural
materials, e.g., sediment and vegetation, for the realization of
effective flood infrastructure while providing opportunities for
nature development (De Vriend and Van Koningsveld 2012).
Because projects using BwN design principles simultaneously
integrate societal goals such as flood safety and recreation with
nature development goals, multiple actors with a diversity of
backgrounds are either directly involved or affected. Thus, to
establish successful initiatives and come up with solutions that
are acceptable for all those actors, participatory project
development is of key importance. 
In participatory project developments, such as those proposed by
BwN, decisions are made collectively, favoring the involvement
of a diversity of actors from different sectors and levels, i.e., state,
regional, and municipal. The underlying rationale is that
including a diverse range of actors can lead to a more integral
and better accepted project development process (Bouwen and
Taillieu 2004, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007a). However, despite its
benefits, multiactor decision-making processes can be
complicated to reach and implement. One difficulty originates
from the multiplicity of frames that may be simultaneously
present in decision making. In a multiactor setting, each actor
can frame the project differently, causing a situation of ambiguity
in which it is no longer clear what the issues of concern and action
paths are (Brugnach et al. 2011), hindering participation and
collaboration among actors. This consideration suggests that
paying attention to ambiguity and framing differences is of
essential importance in nature-inclusive flood infrastructure
projects. This idea is also supported by previous research on the
Sand Engine project, an innovative sand nourishment project
based on BwN design principles, which showed that the Sand
Engine’s project development process was susceptible to being
hampered by ambiguity (Van den Hoek et al. 2012).  
However, dealing with differences in framing is far from
straightforward because the resulting ambiguity can polarize the
actors. Although some ambiguity is a necessity for generating
change and innovation, it has to be kept at a manageable level
(Dewulf et al. 2005) because framing differences can also result
in intergroup conflict (Gray 2004). This issue is illustrated by the
Sand Engine project, where opponents of the initiative had a
negative view of the project’s effects on swimming safety and
demanded its cancellation. Because the project team was not
willing to fulfill this request, the conflict even ended up in the
Dutch parliament: A large political party supported the
opponents, posed critical questions, and demanded the immediate
cancellation of the initiative (Van den Hoek et al. 2012). Although
the project was eventually implemented successfully, this incident
clearly illustrates the importance that ambiguity can have in the
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development of flood infrastructure projects using BwN
principles. Moreover, it points to the need to identify the origin
of the underlying framing differences to develop better strategies
for dealing with ambiguity and thereby prevent unnecessary cost
overruns, delays, or cancellation of promising initiatives. 
The goal of this research is to investigate the origin of ambiguity
in flood infrastructure projects using BwN design principles. To
this end, we studied the framing differences that emerged between
the project development team and the stakeholders in two
different BwN projects, namely the Sand Engine Delfland and
the Safety Buffer Oyster Dam. Our analysis focused on identifying
the differences that existed between the frames held by individual
actors during project development. We paid particular attention
to conflicting stakeholder interests, diverging values and beliefs,
different backgrounds, and past experiences as triggers of framing
differences that may lead to ambiguity. For both aforementioned
case studies, we performed interviews with key project actors,
attended public project meetings, and studied project documents
as supporting material. After the data collection, we identified
which ambiguities were most important for the case study project’s
development process, characterized the individual actors’ frames
regarding these ambiguities, and identified the actor attributes
underlying these frames.
FRAMES, FRAMING, AND AMBIGUITY IN DECISION
MAKING
A frame refers to a sense-making device that mediates the
interpretation of reality (Weick 1995). As such, it indicates what
is relevant for an actor, or a group of actors, regarding a decision
issue or an event. Through framing, a decision issue or an event
acquires meaning, drawing the limits of what the problem is that
needs to be decided on, how it is defined, and who is part of the
decision making (see Schön and Rein 1994, Benford and Snow
2000, Dewulf et al. 2009 for reviews on frames and framing
processes). Actors’ frames may diverge from one another, so in a
decision-making process with multiple actors involved, the
simultaneous presence of different but equally valid frames is
unavoidable. When these frames are incompatible, they can cause
a specific type of uncertainty called ambiguity, which indicates
that there are different possible, yet equally valid, interpretations
of a problem situation (Brugnach et al. 2008, 2011). 
As illustrated in the Introduction, a situation of ambiguity can be
a major problem in decision making because it can easily result
in a state of indecisiveness or even conflict. The relevant
dimension of ambiguity is something ranging from unanimous
clarity to total confusion caused by too many people voicing
different but still valid interpretations (Dewulf et al. 2005).
Different facts can mean different things for different actors,
different issues can be held as relevant facts, and different
solutions can be favored (Schön and Rein 1994, Dewulf et al.
2004). Although similarities between actors and their preferences
will probably contribute to avoid ambiguity, completely shared
meaning and views are not required in multiactor decision
making. Donnellon et al. (1986) argue that so-called equifinal
meaning is sufficient: interpretations that are dissimilar but that
have similar behavioral implications. If  there is sufficiently shared
understanding among actors, then they have a common ground
to come to a collective action or decision.
Actor attributes related to frames
Dewulf and Bouwen (2012:170) elaborate on the topic of framing
differences and define issue framing as “arranging and
rearranging the elements of an issue such that its meaning is
altered. [This is] a process which involves selecting certain issue
elements as part of the frame while leaving out others and putting
particular issue elements into focus while leaving only a marginal
role for other elements.” In short, this implies that individual
frames can differ at a particular point in time when a focal element
of the frame of one actor challenges or conflicts with a focal
element of the frame of another actor with whom he or she
interacts. For this research, we performed an extensive literature
review to identify specific elements or attributes that several
authors mention as playing an important role in framing processes
and the formation of individual actors’ frames. 
Interests, i.e., the ambitions or goals of an actor and/or his or her
organization, affect the framing process. Schön and Rein (1994)
address that there is a reciprocal, but nondeterministic,
relationship between an actor’s frames and interests. Hence,
although interests influence the way we frame an issue, frames
can also influence our interests. In their studies on social
movement organizations (SMOs), Snow et al. (1986) and Benford
and Snow (2000) also discuss the connection between framing
and interests; they argue that creating a shared interest is a proper
strategy to align frames among the SMO’s participants and
potential new SMO members. 
The values and beliefs of an actor influence how he or she frames
an issue (Benford and Snow 2000, Nisbet and Mooney 2007,
Brugnach and Ingram 2012). Values reflect an actor’s sense of
right and wrong and what he or she holds as important, whereas
beliefs are propositions or premises an actor holds to be true.
Hoekstra (2000) concludes that the perspectives actors hold in
controversies in the field of water resources management differ
because of their underlying basic values, beliefs, and assumptions.
Dewulf et al. (2005) discuss that differing beliefs can inform very
different ways to make sense of an issue and can thus lead to
different frames. Renn et al. (2011) address the topic of ambiguity
and state that it refers to the presence of multiple values. 
Personal backgrounds and experiences shape the way we frame
(Bouwen and Taillieu 2004, Gray 2004). Actors with a
background in either the natural or the social sciences can frame
an issue rather differently (Dewulf et al. 2005). Furthermore,
highly personal experiences, which are part of a personal
subjective history, can inform different ways of making sense of
a situation (Weick 1995). Moreover, even if  actors supposedly
share the same experiences, they may still use different repertoires
to make sense of what is going on (Brummans et al. 2008).
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and Nisbet (2009) discuss the role
of the media in framing and state that to make sense of policy
discussions, the audience integrates the frame provided by the
media with its own pre-existing interpretations based on, for
instance, personal experiences. 
Frames can also derive from the societal position of an actor
(Dewulf et al. 2005, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007a, 2007b). In a
multiactor decision-making process, an actor can yield power
from his or her specific position by holding specific knowledge or
from having a good reputation. Kaplan (2008) states that one
frame can prevail over another if  actors can gain power by
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supporting the frame of more powerful actors. De Boer et al.
(2010) argue that actors with more power have more control over
frames that are being used. Carragee and Roefs (2004) address
that the role of power in framing is often neglected, whereas it is
in fact a key issue. Furthermore, framing can be influenced by the
political position of an actor. Framing differences can originate
out of different levels of government because of differences in
electorate scale and responsibility (Dewulf et al. 2005). As
Brugnach et al. (2011) state, ambiguity can occur at different
political levels, and preferences at the regional policy level may
partly contradict local and/or national policies. 
In short, the results of our literature review suggest that the way
in which an actor frames an issue is influenced by that actor’s
interests, values, beliefs, background, previous experiences, and
societal or political position. These attributes influence how
people interpret reality and the type of interactions in which they
engage. We focus on an analysis of how ambiguity in decision
making originates from a difference between the frames of
individual actors. Building on the previously discussed work of
Dewulf and Bouwen (2012), we suggest that the individual actor
attributes can be interpreted as issue elements, of which some may
contribute to an actor’s frame regarding a certain issue and others
may not. If  the actors involved in a multiactor decision-making
process incorporate conflicting elements in their frames, the
resulting framing difference can cause a tension potentially
leading to a situation of ambiguity.
METHODS
As mentioned in the Introduction, we studied two flood
infrastructure projects based on BwN design principles, namely
the Sand Engine project and the Safety Buffer Oyster Dam
project. We selected these specific projects because they are two
of the most well-known examples of BwN projects in the
Netherlands. Future BwN projects are likely to resemble these
two initiatives. Additionally, we already had existing contacts with
people involved in the projects. 
For both case studies, we used interviews and observations as our
main data collection methods. For the Sand Engine project (see
Case Study 1: Sand Engine Delfland), we first attended three
public information meetings. During these meetings,
stakeholders, i.e., those affected by the project who are not part
of the project team, and the general public had the opportunity
to pose critical questions, express their appreciation or concerns
about the project, and file complaints. Minutes of these meetings
were made and studied to understand the viewpoints of the
stakeholders. Second, in April and May 2011, we interviewed six
actors associated with the project team, i.e., three former members
of the Sand Engine project team, one member of the project
steering group, and two experts involved in the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) and modeling, about uncertainty during
project development. The semistructured interviews were
conducted in the Dutch language, took between one and two
hours, and were recorded and transcribed. A standardized
interview protocol with seven open-ended main questions and
several follow-up questions was used. During the interviews, the
interviewees were invited to elaborate on their definition or
understanding of uncertainty. Thereafter, the interviews
continued with an iterative process of identifying uncertainties
and elaborating on the uncertainty’s relevance for the Sand Engine
development process. We specifically examined the ambiguities
we identified in the project and did not take other types of
uncertainty into account. 
For the Safety Buffer Oyster Dam project (see Case Study 2:
Safety Buffer Oyster Dam), first, we attended a meeting of the
project’s knowledge development team in March 2012. This
meeting was recorded and transcribed. The various discourses
between actors were analyzed to identify the project’s main
discussion topics and framing differences. Second, in April 2012,
we attended a meeting of the project’s sounding board, consisting
of multiple stakeholders. During this meeting, the project team
informed the sounding board on the progress of the project’s
development and invited them to respond to three alternative
project designs. The meeting was not recorded, but minutes were
made and studied to identify the main discussion topics and
framing differences. Third, we conducted 4 interviews with actors
associated with the project team, performed by 2 interviewers,
and 9 interviews with stakeholders, performed by 1 interviewer,
in July, August, and September 2012. During 3 of these interviews,
2 respondents were interviewed instead of 1. Hence, in total, we
spoke to 6 project team actors, i.e., 3 at the executive level and 3
at the project level, and 10 stakeholders. The semistructured
interviews were conducted in the Dutch language, took about 1
hour, and were recorded and transcribed. Two standardized
interview protocols, i.e., 1 for the project team actors and 1 for
the stakeholders, with up to 14 open-ended main questions were
used. During the interviews, the interviewees were invited to
elaborate on those project topics that were most important for
them, but that also caused the hardest discussions within the
project because of the existence of diverging viewpoints. 
For both cases, our analysis started with identifying which
ambiguities were most important by considering two aspects: the
ambiguity’s potential impact and its project-wide relevance for
the actors. During the interviews, we invited the interviewees to
elaborate on the impact each ambiguity identified could have on
the project’s development process, e.g., whether this ambiguity
could lead to substantial cost overrun, a substantial delay, or even
project cancellation. Thus, we were able to assess whether the
ambiguity was important, e.g., potentially leading to a significant
delay of six months, or not important, e.g., only leading to a
budget increase of €100. Moreover, after finalizing the series of
interviews and meetings, we assessed during which interviews and
meetings a particular ambiguity was brought up. If  an ambiguity
was brought up during several interviews and meetings, this
clearly implied that the ambiguity had a project-wide relevance
according to multiple actors and was not just the “favorite
subject” of one actor. 
After identifying the most important ambiguities, we determined,
based on the interview data and our observations at the meetings,
which actors were holding different frames regarding each of these
ambiguities. The individual frames of these actors were identified
by carefully studying the interviews we had with them, specifically
by assessing how they interpreted the particular subject that the
ambiguity concerned. We used the interviews with other actors,
observations of the meetings, and written documentation, i.e.,
such as project documents, as supporting material for identifying
the frames because these data sources often provided detailed
additional information about the ambiguities and the frames of
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the individual actors. Thereafter, we identified the underlying
actor attributes of the frames from the interview material,
observations from meetings, project documents, information
about the organization the interviewee was representing, and
common sense. For each attribute, we performed this
identification by explicitly examining the research questions
proposed in Table 1. These research questions were formulated
based on the theory that we discussed in our literature review of
the attributes. By answering these specific research questions, we
were able to accurately identify each attribute for each actor.
Finally, we compared the frames that the different actors held
regarding the ambiguities, compared the attributes of the actors
involved, and determined which of these attributes were
conflicting and which were not conflicting. Thereby, we
elaborated a deeper understanding of why the individual frames
differed and could lead to ambiguity in decision making.
Table 1. Questions posed to identify actor attributes regarding a
specific discussion topic.
 
Attributes Questions
Interests What are the main ambitions or goals of the actor?
Values Which moral principles does the actor hold as important
regarding the topic? Which criteria or boundary conditions
are used to evaluate the topic?
Beliefs Which propositions or premises does the actor hold to be
true regarding the topic (even if  there is no or
contradictory evidence)?
Backgro­
und
Which expertise, education, or specific knowledge does the
actor have regarding the topic? Is the actor an expert or a
layman regarding the topic?
Experie­
nces
From which (personal) historical situations does the actor
draw to interpret the topic?
Actor
position
What is the societal or political position of the actor
regarding the topic compared to other relevant actors, in
terms of power or influence?
To further clarify the methods discussed previously, we provide
Appendix 1 with a detailed example of how we identified the
individual actors’ frames and attributes from our research data.
We extensively elaborate in Appendix 1 on how we came to the
results concerning one of the important ambiguities identified in
the Safety Buffer case.
CASE STUDY 1: SAND ENGINE DELFLAND
Case description
Over the past centuries, the sandy Holland coast of the
Netherlands has been continuously retreating (see Van
Koningsveld et al. 2008 for an overview of the historical
development of the Dutch coast). The balance between the supply
of sediment from fluvial and marine sources and the demand for
sediment created by sea-level rise is negative (Mulder et al. 2011).
To tackle the problem of coastal retreat, the Dutch government
implemented the Dynamic Preservation policy: The sandy
coastline has to be maintained at its 1990 position by performing
periodic, relatively small-scale sand nourishments (Hillen and
Roelse 1995). Currently, the annual sand nourishment volume for
the Dutch coast has a target value of 12 million m³/year, whereas
an increase to at least 20 million m³/year is needed to preserve the
sediment balance of the Dutch coast (Mulder et al. 2011). 
Sand Engine Delfland (in Dutch: Zandmotor) is an innovative
sand nourishment pilot project of 21.5 million m³ near Ter Heijde
in the Dutch province of South Holland (see Fig. 1). After a
project development process of approximately 3 years, the Sand
Engine peninsula was constructed between March and July 2011.
It is a large-scale experiment to test the feasibility of mega-sized
sand nourishments, which are anticipated to be more cost-
effective and less disturbing to the natural environment because
of their long expected life span of 20-50 years. The Sand Engine
is based on BwN design principles because the large amount of
sand nourishment will spread along the coast by natural
dynamics, i.e., waves, currents, and wind, causing the coast, i.e.,
both beach area and dunes, to expand in a rather natural way.
Fig. 1. Sand Engine Delfland (https://beeldbank.rws.nl,
Rijkswaterstaat / Joop van Houdt).
Currently, the Sand Engine is in the postconstruction monitoring
phase. Because of its pilot status, the project will be monitored
extensively to study whether mega-sized sand nourishments are
capable of combining benefits for society, e.g., coastline
maintenance and increased area for beach recreation, and
development of the natural system, e.g., increased dune habitat
for flora and fauna. Model calculations of various alternative
Sand Engine designs have contributed to decision making by
estimating morphological effects and changes in important
indicators, especially coastline maintenance and dune
development (Mulder and Tonnon 2010). However, because
weather conditions are highly unpredictable, especially over a
20-50 year period, these estimations involve high levels of
uncertainty. As a consequence, project development was
susceptible to being hampered by several important framing
differences regarding the impact of the Sand Engine.
Results
We identified three important ambiguous issues in the
development process of the Sand Engine project between the
project team and stakeholders. Although the project was
successfully implemented in 2011, all ambiguities identified
concerned issues that, according to multiple interviewees, could
have hampered the Sand Engine project development process or
might even have led to its cancellation (Van den Hoek et al. 2012). 
The first ambiguity, between the Sand Engine project team and
the action committee “Stop the Sand Engine,” concerned the
Ecology and Society 19(2): 51
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art51/
effect of the Sand Engine on swimmer safety (see Table 2). This
discussion contained two main themes: (1) the effects of the Sand
Engine peninsula on the physical swimming conditions, such as
flow velocities; and (2) the risk that this would result in an unsafe
situation and accidents. Although the project team drew on its
background as an expert regarding sand nourishments to evaluate
the issue of swimmer safety and presumed its morphological
predictive models to be trustworthy, the action committee
consisted of local residents with local knowledge based on
personal swimming experiences. Both actors shared the value that
they have a social responsibility for the safety of human beings
in the vicinity of the Sand Engine. Furthermore, regarding the
physical conditions in the coastal zone, both opposing parties had
the same belief  that these conditions were unpredictable to a large
extent. However, regarding the swimmer safety situation, we
identified a key framing difference. The project team had the
positive frame that the Sand Engine was an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. This frame was mainly based on the belief
that the project would not lead to unsafe situations if  proper
precautionary measures were taken, such as additional training
for beach lifeguards and prohibiting swimming in the vicinity of
the Sand Engine. However, the action committee held a more
skeptical frame: The Sand Engine’s construction was socially
unacceptable because the committee’s belief  was that it would
have an adverse impact on swimming conditions. In the end, the
project team had a more powerful position because it was
supported by the national government, whereas the action
committee was only supported by one political party. 
The second ambiguity concerned the effect of the Sand Engine
on beach recreation conditions (see Table 3). Specifically, there
was a discourse between the project team and the action
committee on the risk that dumped World War II ammunition
would end up in the nourishment sand, posing a potential threat
to beach tourists. The project team had its previously discussed
positive frame, based on the belief  that the construction of the
Sand Engine would not lead to unsafe beach conditions. For
instance, the project team drew on its experiences that
constructors work with high-quality dredging ships equipped
with special antiammunition grids and that previous nourishment
did not have noteworthy ammunition incidents. However, the
frame of the action committee was also quite skeptical regarding
the risks of ammunition because it held the belief  that it was a
certainty that accidents would happen. This viewpoint was further
supported by an informal report of an amateur military historian,
which discusses the risks and some past experiences with
ammunition on the beach. 
The third ambiguity, between the Sand Engine project team and
a drinking water stakeholder, concerned the effect of the artificial
peninsula on groundwater levels and drinking water quality (see
Table 4). Both actors shared the value that they have a social
responsibility for the health and safety of humans. According to
several interviewees and as stated in the project’s EIA, the positive
project team frame, i.e., that the project was socially acceptable,
was based on the belief  that the presence of the Sand Engine
would not have substantial effects on groundwater levels and thus
would have no impact on drinking water quality, if  some minor
precautionary measures were taken. Because of strict time
constraints, the project team preferred a fast, rather limited
assessment of the effects and had the belief  that this was sufficient.
Table 2. Sand Engine ambiguity 1: about the effects on swimmer
safety.
 
Actor Frames and actor attributes
Sand Engine project team
Frame: the Sand Engine is an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. The project is vital to learn about
possibilities for future coastal maintenance
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to learn about how to improve coastal maintenance,
while simultaneously creating opportunities for nature and
recreation
Value: social responsibility for human safety
Belief: the physical conditions of the coastal zone are
unpredictable
Belief: the Sand Engine will not cause unsafe swimming
conditions if  proper precautionary measures are taken
Belief: morphological models generate trustworthy knowledge
and prediction
Background: expert regarding flood infrastructure and sand
nourishments
Actor position: powerful actor supported by the government
 
Action committee
Frame: the Sand Engine is a socially unacceptable initiative
with adverse effects
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to protect recreational safety, by preventing Sand
Engine implementation
Value: social responsibility for human safety
Belief: the physical conditions of the coastal zone are
unpredictable
Belief: accidents are a certainty because of negatively
influenced swimming conditions
Background: local residents of the project area
Experience: in the nearshore coastal zone, unexpected current
conditions can occur
Actor position: less powerful coalition supported by one of the
larger political party
However, the drinking water stakeholder was not satisfied, held
the belief  that the initiative would have a substantial impact, and
demanded additional research. The stakeholder had the frame
that the Sand Engine was an promising initiative, which might be
acceptable after an accurate assessment of its impacts. Although
the drinking water stakeholder had the expert background
regarding this specific topic, the project team was not an expert
regarding drinking water. Moreover, the project team had a less
powerful actor position than the drinking water stakeholder
regarding this specific issue. The drinking water stakeholder was
an essential and necessary partner for the realization of the Sand
Engine project because it was assigned with specific
postimplementation maintenance and monitoring tasks.
CASE STUDY 2: SAFETY BUFFER OYSTER DAM
Case description
After the dramatic 1953 flooding of the southwestern provinces
of the Netherlands, causing the deaths of more than 1800 people,
the Dutch government commissioned the so-called Delta
Ecology and Society 19(2): 51
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art51/
Table 3. Sand Engine ambiguity 2: about the effects on beach
recreation conditions.
 
Actor Frames and actor attributes
Sand Engine project team
Frame: the Sand Engine is an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. The project is vital to learn about
possibilities for future coastal maintenance
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to learn about how to improve coastal maintenance,
while simultaneously creating opportunities for nature and
recreation
Value: social responsibility for human safety
Belief: the Sand Engine will not lead to unsafe beach
conditions
Background: expert regarding flood infrastructure and sand
nourishments
Experience: dredging companies use ships with
antiammunition grids
Experience: during regular nourishments similar to the Sand
Engine, there were no noteworthy incidents with ammunition
Actor position: powerful actor supported by the government
 
Action committee
Frame: the Sand Engine is a socially unacceptable initiative
with adverse effects
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to protect recreational safety, by preventing Sand
Engine implementation
Value: social responsibility for human safety
Belief: accidents are a certainty because nourishment sand
contains ammunition
Background: local residents of the project area
Experience: ammunition, which is occasionally found on the
beach, can be dangerous
Actor position: less powerful coalition supported by one of the
larger political party
Committee to come up with a plan to improve the Dutch flood
defense system to prevent future disasters (Kabat et al. 2009). The
committee created a Delta Plan, which consisted of major dike
improvements and the closure of several large tidal inlets. Over
the years, the plans of the Delta Committee were implemented
and became a worldwide premium example of flood protection.
However, although new disasters have been prevented
successfully, the Delta Works did have some partly unexpected
negative side effects. Because of the closure of the Eastern Scheldt
estuary by the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier, the tidal
movement in the estuary was reduced by ∼25% (Vranken et al.
1990, Mulder and Louters 1994). Furthermore, the inflow of fresh
sediment from the North Sea into the water system of the Eastern
Scheldt is negligible because of the storm surge barrier, whereas
the redistribution of sediment toward the estuary’s channels
remains constant, i.e., the so-called Sand Hunger problem. This
imbalance between the Eastern Scheldt morphology and
hydrodynamics leads to an internal redistribution of sediments,
causing the erosion of the existing salt marshes and mudflats, and
thus the loss of valuable ecological habitat and natural foreshore
protection.
Table 4. Sand Engine ambiguity 3: about the effects on
groundwater level / drinking water quality.
 
Actor Frames and actor attributes
Sand Engine project team
Frame: the Sand Engine is an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. The project is vital to learn about
possibilities for future coastal maintenance
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to learn about how to improve coastal maintenance,
while simultaneously creating opportunities for nature and
recreation
Value: social responsibility for human health and safety
Belief: the Sand Engine will not have substantial effects on the
ground and drinking water, if  some minor precautionary
measures are taken
Background: not a specific expert regarding drinking water
Actor position: less powerful actor as it requires the
cooperation of the drinking water stakeholder for the project’s
maintenance and monitoring
 
Drinking water stakeholder
Frame: the Sand Engine is an promising initiative, which might
be acceptable after an accurate assessment of its impacts
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to supply safe drinking water of high quality to
society
Value: social responsibility for human health and safety
Belief: the Sand Engine will have substantial effects on
groundwater levels and thus is a threat for the quality of the
drinking water supply
Background: experts regarding drinking water
Actor position: powerful actor as it is a required project
partner
The Oyster Dam is a so-called compartment work in the Eastern
Scheldt (see Fig. 2). One of its main functions is to decrease the
total area of the Eastern Scheldt to increase the tidal difference
of ebb and flood tide, which had dropped after construction of
the storm surge barrier. Thus, the Oyster Dam is partly a
countermeasure for the negative influence of the storm surge
barrier on the tidal movement. Additionally, it functions as a flood
protection work for the hinterland. Because of the construction
of the Oyster Dam and the Philips Dam, a second compartment
work in the Eastern Scheldt, the decrease of the tidal difference
was limited to ∼10% compared to the tidal difference before the
construction of the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier (Mulder
and Louters 1994, Eelkema et al. 2012). However, the described
Sand Hunger problem still remains unsolved. 
Currently, the Oyster Dam requires maintenance because the
stone layer on its slope has to be replaced. This maintenance work
opened a window of opportunity for the pilot project Safety
Buffer Oyster Dam (in Dutch: Veiligheidsbuffer Oesterdam): a
sand nourishment of 425,000 m³ in front of the dam to reduce
future maintenance efforts of the dam, while simultaneously
restoring one of the eroded tidal flats to its historical state.
Furthermore, an erosion-preventing artificial oyster reef will be
constructed north of the planned nourishment area. Both
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measures are clear-cut examples of the application of BwN design
principles: the initiative copes with the effects of the Sand Hunger
problem using natural materials and dynamics, while
concurrently strengthening the foundation of the Oyster Dam.
The nourishment works were finished in October 2013.
Nevertheless, a successful outcome of the pilot project has been
far from certain because of the active involvement of multiple
stakeholders and a project team that consists of two Dutch
governmental agencies and a nongovernmental environmental
interest organization, which all have different basic interests and
preferences.
Fig. 2. Oyster Dam (https://beeldbank.rws.nl, Rijkswaterstaat /
Joop van Houdt).
Results
We identified two important ambiguous issues in the development
process of the Safety Buffer Oyster Dam project between the
project team and two stakeholders. Although the stakeholders
have dropped their opposition in the meanwhile and now accept
the development of the project, the initial ambiguity could have
significantly hampered the Safety Buffer’s development process.
An official appeal against the project could have delayed the
initiative for at least six months. 
The first ambiguity, between the Safety Buffer project team and
the economically vital oyster sector, concerned the effects of the
Safety Buffer nourishment on the oyster beds that are located in
the vicinity of the project area (see Table 5). Although shellfish
are able to filter a certain amount of sediment entering their gills,
an excess will surely suffocate these organisms. During a recent
nourishment pilot project, a mussel bed located nearby
experienced some minor damage. Therefore, both the mussel and
oyster sectors initially framed the Safety Buffer nourishment as
an unacceptable initiative because they held the belief  that large
quantities of sand could damage their cultivated shellfish beds.
Although several interviewees, including a representative from the
mussel cultivation sector, indicated that they currently were
confident that the nourishment would not have any adverse
impacts, the oyster sector still held the strong belief  that the Safety
Buffer nourishment was potentially harmful. However, the oyster
sector, contrary to the project team, did not have an expert
background regarding flood management. Moreover, the project
team held the value to protect stakeholder interests and
formulated the following project boundary conditions: (1) the
Safety Buffer was not allowed to have any negative effects on
stakeholders, and (2) all unforeseen damage had to be fully
compensated. Thus, the project team had the positive frame that
the Safety Buffer was a socially acceptable project because the
team intended to fulfill the boundary conditions and held the
belief  that the expert judgment of the project’s effects was
trustworthy. Furthermore, the project team also referred to recent
successful experiences with nourishment pilots in the Eastern
Scheldt. Regarding the difference with the oyster sector, the actor
positions seemed to be rather equal: Both the project team and
the oyster sector indicated that they did not have sufficient power
to overrule the other actor.
Table 5. Safety Buffer Oyster Dam ambiguity 1: about the effects
of the nourishment on oyster beds.
 
Actor Frames and actor attributes
Safety Buffer project team
Frame: the Safety Buffer is an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. The project is vital to learn about
possibilities for future dike maintenance and dealing with the
effects of the Sand Hunger
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to learn about how to improve dike maintenance,
while simultaneously aiming to improve the Eastern Scheldt
estuary’s natural, recreation, and user quality
Value: social responsibility for the well-being of the Eastern
Scheldt estuary
Value: responsibility not to harm external stakeholders’
interests
Belief: the Safety Buffer will not have adverse effects on the
shellfish beds
Belief: expert judgment yields trustworthy predictions
Background: expert regarding flood infrastructure and sand
nourishments
Experience: positive results of nourishment pilots in recent
years
Actor position: although a powerful actor supported by the
government, they claim to be unable to overrule the
economically vital oyster sector
 
Oyster sector
Frame: the Safety Buffer is an unacceptable initiative because
of its potential adverse impacts on the oyster sector, although
the degrading quality of the estuary is acknowledged
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to maximize the profit of the oyster sector
Value: social responsibility for the well-being of the Eastern
Scheldt estuary
Belief: the Safety Buffer will almost certainly have negative
effects on the oyster beds
Background: economic users of the area, nonexperts regarding
sand nourishments
Experience: during a previous pilot, a mussel bed suffered
some minor damage
Actor position: economically vital actor, although without
formal power to prevent project implementation
Ecology and Society 19(2): 51
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art51/
The second ambiguity, between the Safety Buffer project team
and an environmental interest group, concerned the effects of the
Safety Buffer nourishment on the benthic organisms currently
living in the soil of the existing tidal flat (see Table 6). Similar to
the Sand Engine framing difference on swimmer safety, this
discussion contained two main themes: (1) the effects of the
nourishment on the living conditions of the benthic organisms
and (2) the acceptability of the implementation of a project with
a major impact on those living conditions. Both actors shared the
value that the well-being of the Eastern Scheldt system was
important. Furthermore, regarding the living conditions, both
opposing parties had the same belief: Most benthic organisms
living in the soil of a nourished area would die. However, regarding
the acceptability of the project, there was a key framing difference.
The project team had the frame that the project was acceptable,
based on the beliefs that the quality of the nourished tidal habitat
would improve in the future and that valuable knowledge would
be generated for future initiatives to preserve the Eastern Scheldt
system. Initially, the environmental interest group had a quite
different view on the acceptability of the project. Although it
acknowledged that measures were needed to cope with the effects
of the Sand Hunger, the group argued that it was unacceptable
to nourish large quantities of sand on top of the benthic
organisms. This frame was mainly based on the incorrect
presumption that the total area of the existing tidal flat would be
nourished. However, the project team, an expert in sand
nourishment designs, intended to only nourish half  of the existing
tidal flat and use natural dynamics to gradually spread the sand
toward the other part of the tidal flat. Furthermore, experiences
with recent nourishment pilots in the Eastern Scheldt showed that
the benthic organisms reclaimed their habitat within due time.
Regarding this specific issue, the actor positions were rather
unclear. Although the project team was powerful and supported
by the government, the environmental interest group was an
independent actor that could appeal against initiatives that
discomforted the group.
DISCUSSION
We first discuss which of the actor attributes seems to be the
conflicting focal element from which the ambiguity in our case
studies originates. Second, we discuss that an actor’s background
seems to influence the perceived legitimacy of his or her viewpoint
regarding the ambiguity. Finally, we elaborate on what these two
findings imply for how ambiguity is and should be coped with in
our case study projects.
From which actor attributes does the ambiguity originate?
In the two previous sections, we identified five ambiguous issues
that could have potentially hampered the development of our two
BwN case study projects. Despite the fact that these five
ambiguities all concern a different issue, our results suggest a
distinct similarity regarding the underlying actor attributes
leading to ambiguity: The beliefs of the actors involved are
contradictory. In terms of the discussed work of Dewulf and
Bouwen (2012), the actor attribute beliefs seems to be the
conflicting focal element from which the ambiguity arises. 
Regarding both the ambiguities about swimmer safety and beach
recreation conditions, the Sand Engine project team’s positive
frame was primarily based on the beliefs that (1) the project would
not cause unsafe recreational conditions if  proper precautionary
Table 6. Safety Buffer Oyster Dam ambiguity 2: about the
acceptability (benthic organisms).
 
Actor Frames and actor attributes
Safety Buffer project team
Frame: the Safety Buffer is an innovative and socially
acceptable pilot project. The project is vital to learn about
possibilities for future dike maintenance and dealing with the
effects of the Sand Hunger
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to learn about how to improve dike maintenance,
while simultaneously aiming to improve the Eastern Scheldt
estuary’s natural, recreation, and user quality
Value: social responsibility for the well-being of the Eastern
Scheldt estuary
Belief: benthic organisms currently living in the nourished area
will die, but the tidal flat habitat will improve in the future
Belief: implementing the preferred design, partially nourishing
the tidal flat, will yield knowledge that can be used for future
initiatives
Background: expert regarding flood infrastructure and sand
nourishments
Experience: positive results of nourishment pilots in recent
years
Actor position: powerful actor supported by the government
 
Environmental interest group
Frame: implementation of the Safety Buffer is unacceptable
because of its initial adverse impacts on the natural
environment
 
(Attributes from which the frame originates)
Interest: to protect the existing natural environment
Value: social responsibility for the natural environment
Belief: the benthic organisms currently living in the nourished
tidal flat area will die
Belief: the full tidal flat area, not just a part, will be nourished
Background: laypersons regarding sand nourishments
Actor position: independent actor that can appeal against the
project, potentially causing a delay of six months
measures were taken, and that (2) morphological models provided
trustworthy predictions for these conditions. The action
committee’s skeptical frame was based on the belief  that accidents
were a certainty because of negatively influenced swimming
conditions. The ambiguity between the Safety Buffer project team
and the oyster sector was also a contradiction of beliefs. Whereas
the project team’s positive frame was based on the beliefs that the
Safety Buffer would not have adverse effects on the shellfish beds
and that expert judgment provided trustworthy predictions, the
oyster sector held the belief  that the Safety Buffer almost certainly
would have adverse impacts on the cultivated shellfish beds. The
second Safety Buffer ambiguity, about the acceptability of the
project despite initial negative impacts on benthic organisms, was
caused by the incorrect presumption, i.e., a belief, of the
environmental interest group that the total area of the tidal flat
would be nourished. However, the project team’s positive frame
was based on the belief  that its well-considered preferred design
had limited impacts on the existing benthic organisms and would
improve the habitat in the future. 
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The ambiguity about the effect of the Sand Engine on drinking
water safety was a special case because, contrary to the other four
ambiguous issues, the project team was not the actor that held
the most powerful position regarding this specific issue.
Nevertheless, also in this special case, the beliefs of the actors
involved were contradictory. The Sand Engine project team held
a strong belief  that the effects on the groundwater and drinking
water were negligible, although there was only limited knowledge
available. However, the drinking water stakeholder, an expert
regarding this specific issue, demanded an additional extensive
impact assessment because its belief  was that the project might
have substantial effects on the quality of the drinking water
supply. 
The ambiguity in BwN project development does not seem to
originate from conflicting values or interests of the actors
involved. Thacher (2001) suggests that, when particular actors
aim to collaborate, problems often occur because of a conflict
over differing values. However, although this may be generally
true, in the two cases we studied, the project teams and the
stakeholders shared similar values, such as the social
responsibility for human safety or the natural environment.
Because these moral principles were collectively shared, this
implies that ambiguity in the project development of our cases
did not originate from conflicting values. Interests is yet another
attribute from which ambiguity could originate because in the
field of intergroup conflict research, diverging and incompatible
interests, goals, and ambitions have been a main focus of attention
(see, e.g., Campbell 1965, Lewicki et al. 1992, Bornstein 2003).
However, in the specific cases we studied, we observed that the
interests of the actors involved were dissimilar but not
contradictory. This consideration suggests that, regarding the
interests held by the different parties, there is a situation of
equifinal meaning (sensu Donnellon et al. 1986), a common
ground for the actors involved. In the Sand Engine case, the action
committee’s interest was to protect the safety of local swimmers
and beach recreants, whereas the drinking water stakeholder was
responsible for the quality of the drinking water supply. In the
Safety Buffer case, the oyster sector defended its economic
interests, whereas the environmental interest group’s interest was
to protect the existing natural environment. The main interest of
the two project teams involved was to learn about how to improve
the current flood management practices, while simultaneously
creating opportunities for users of the area, the natural
environment, and recreation. This project team interest was not
precisely the same as the stakeholders’ interests, but it was also
clear that they did not interfere with each other. Hence, we argue
that although the interests of the actors involved were dissimilar,
they did not seem to be the conflicting focal element from which
the ambiguity in our case studies originated.
Whose beliefs seem to be perceived as more legitimate?
Although we found that the ambiguity in our two case studies
seemed to originate from a difference between the beliefs of the
actors, our results revealed that there was yet another actor
attribute that seemed to influence the perceived legitimacy of
those beliefs, namely the actor’s background. For each of the five
ambiguous issues identified, we observed that one actor had an
expert background regarding the issue and the other actor was a
group of laypersons. Although the expert’s previous experiences
seemed to be perceived as a legitimate source of knowledge, the
experiences and stories of the lay actor were often not taken into
account and seemed to be considered as less legitimate. 
Regarding the Sand Engine ambiguities about swimming safety
and beach recreation safety, the project team was the expert on
sand nourishments and their effects. It further supported its
positive frame by pointing at verifiable past experiences with sand
nourishments, which were carried out without noteworthy
incidents. The action committee was a group of laypersons
regarding the topic of flood infrastructure and sand
nourishments. It supported a skeptical frame with stories of
allegedly negative experiences with sand nourishments and with
the aforementioned informal report by an amateur military
historian. Even though the project team listened to these stories
at the public meetings and was acquainted with the contents of
the report, our observations suggest that these were not fully taken
into account by the project team. During the interviews, the
project team indicated that it “did not actively, over and over
again, engage in conversation [with the action committee]” and
instead focused on “good, honest information,” i.e., on knowledge
that it perceived as legitimate from its particular perspective.
Furthermore, our document study revealed that the report was
not taken into account because its story line lacked verifiable
evidence for a causal relationship between the Sand Engine’s
construction and future incidents with ammunition. For the
ambiguity about drinking water safety, the project team had
significantly less expertise than the specialized drinking water
stakeholder. In the end, the drinking water expert’s belief  was
perceived as the more legitimate one, and the project team had to
change its belief  that the project would not have a substantial
impact on the drinking water situation. 
Similarly, in the Safety Buffer case, the project team was the expert
regarding sand nourishments and their effects and development.
Although the oyster sector and environmental interest group
could be regarded as experts regarding the oyster trade and
natural systems, they were laypersons regarding sand
nourishments and the likelihood of damage because of a specific
sand nourishment. As a justification of its positive beliefs, the
project team enthusiastically referred to successful experiences
with recent nourishment pilots in the Eastern Scheldt. To the
contrary, the oyster sector referred to a negative experience with
a damaged mussel bed, presumably because of one of the recent
pilot projects, and argued that its oyster beds could suffer similar
damage. However, during our interviews, the shellfish sector
indicated that it was almost impossible for it to prove that there
was a causal relationship between damaged shellfish beds and
nourishment activities. Hence, the previous examples illustrate
that it is difficult for nonexperts to have their experiences and
stories taken into account by the expert actors in collective
decision making. 
In the field of risk assessment, the difference between experts and
laypersons has been studied in detail. For instance, Slovic (1999)
argues that although experts are often characterized as objective,
analytic, wise, and rationally based on “the real risks,” in contrast,
the lay public is seen to rely on “perceptions of risk” that are
subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational.
Thus, although an expert is considered to evaluate risks using
“objective” beliefs, the layperson can easily form “subjective”
emotional beliefs. However, there is no consensus about whether
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the expert’s or the layperson’s viewpoint is the more legitimate
one. Although Slovic (1987) argues that the basic
conceptualization of risk by laypeople is much richer than that
of experts and reflects legitimate concerns, Kuran and Sunstein
(1999) disagree and state that nonexpert individuals often lack
knowledge and expertise to make a reliable judgment. On the
other hand, Klinke and Renn (2002) propose a dual approach to
risk management, stating that the identification of risks and the
formulation of risk evaluation criteria should be based on the
social concerns of the public, whereas the “objective” evaluation
of the magnitude of those risks should be performed by experts.
However, involving the emotions and feelings of laypeople in the
actual decision making can be essential (Thacher 2009). Lidskog
(2008) argues that including citizens in the evaluation of risk in
collective decision making is necessary because citizens’ opinions
and reflections can enrich expert advice and recommendations. 
The results of our research suggest that in the current practice of
our two case study projects, an actor’s background seems to
determine whether his or her beliefs are taken into account in the
decision-making process. The beliefs and experiences of experts
seem to be perceived as more legitimate than the beliefs and
experiences of local lay actors, which suggests that experts have
a more privileged and powerful position in multiactor decision
making. We will show that this consideration has major
implications for the way in which we deal with ambiguity in
collective processes.
What are the implications for coping with ambiguity in Building
with Nature projects?
In the ideal situation, coping with ambiguity implies addressing
the underlying framing difference in a multiactor participatory
process because this denotes that it is accepted that there are
multiple ways of making sense of an issue (Brugnach et al. 2011,
Brugnach and Ingram 2012). However, judging which specific
strategy to use for addressing a particular ambiguity depends on
many different factors (Maurel 2003, HarmoniCOP 2005). We
observed that in the current practice of our two BwN case study
projects, the actor positions, i.e., the actors’ power, have major
consequences for the way the ambiguity is dealt with. 
Although the philosophy of the BwN approach advocates that
active involvement of stakeholders is both required and beneficial
(De Vriend and Van Koningsveld 2012), we observed that,
compared to the valuable insights in the literature on participatory
processes, the actual participation of stakeholders often remains
at a low level in the daily practice of our BwN case study projects.
Such a low level of participation is characterized by top-down
communication and an information flow that is mainly one way
(Rowe and Frewer 2000). In the Sand Engine case, public meetings
were the main method to involve stakeholders. Although those
present were invited to express their views on the initiative, the
described meetings mainly consisted of several extensive
presentations to update the public on project development
activities that had already occurred without stakeholders being
involved. Thus, the level of stakeholder participation in the
project generally seemed to be limited to informing (sensu
Arnstein 1969). Furthermore, when confronted with the
ambiguities about the effects of the Sand Engine on swimmer and
beach recreation safety, the role of the action committee was
basically reduced to that of a spectator (sensu Fung 2006). Instead
of solving the underlying framing difference, the project team
prevented a hampered development process by using its power
(see Tables 2 and 3) to let its own frame prevail and neglected the
action committee’s frame; that is, because there was governmental
support, it was decided to implement the project despite persistent
opposition. In terms of stakeholder participation, this mainly
resembled the lowest form of involvement, namely manipulation
(sensu Arnstein 1969). To the contrary, regarding the ambiguity
about drinking water safety, the project team had a less powerful
position (see Table 4), which meant that a form of partnership
(sensu Arnstein 1969) was needed to solve the ambiguity. The
drinking water issue was first addressed by doing the required
additional impact assessment. As a result of this assessment, the
project team changed its belief  that the project would not have a
substantial impact on the drinking water situation. In the end,
the two actors started a negotiation that eventually resulted in the
installation of a pumping station to prevent drinking water
problems. Hence, our results suggest that, in the Sand Engine case,
the level of stakeholder participation in a situation of ambiguity
is related to the relative power that the actors have. 
Conversely, in the Safety Buffer case, the project team indicated
that it strived for a partnership in which project developers and
stakeholders jointly would make plans and develop strategies
(sensu Fung 2006). Although stakeholders were invited to project
meetings to jointly create an inventory of design requirements
and preferences, the actual design process was outsourced to an
external company. Although stakeholders were consulted about
the design alternatives during a sounding board meeting, the
project team explicitly expressed that it would make the final
decisions. Hence, we argue that the actual level of stakeholder
participation is best characterized as consulting (sensu Arnstein
1969). When confronted with ambiguity, power relations, which
are rather unclear in the Safety Buffer case, seem to have
influenced the way in which participation took place. Regarding
the ambiguity about the project’s effects on the oyster beds, both
the project team and oyster sector maneuvered themselves to an
underdog position by stating that they were unable to overrule
the other actor (see Table 5). Eventually, the project team chose
to initiate a renewed interactive process, a sort of partnership
(sensu Arnstein 1969), to jointly come up with a new set of design
alternatives. Regarding the benthic organisms issue, the
environmental interest group was an independent organization
of concerned citizens who could appeal against projects that
discomforted them (see Table 6). The project team engaged in
extensive persuasive conversations with the environmental
interest group to convince it of the project’s positive intentions
and to change the previously discussed incorrect belief  regarding
the size of the nourishment area. In terms of stakeholder
participation, the involvement of the environmental interest
group was basically limited to informing (sensu Arnstein 1969). 
Moreover, we observed, for all five ambiguous issues identified in
our two case studies, that the powerful actor was also the expert
regarding the issue being framed. Although these powerful
experts supported their beliefs with scientific knowledge that was
perceived as legitimate, the laypersons involved were often unable
to have their beliefs taken into account in the decision-making
process as illustrated previously. In short, our observations
suggest that powerful actors with access to scientific knowledge
and expertise were privileged over laypersons in the decision-
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making processes of our two BwN case study projects. However,
the knowledge of both experts and nonexperts needs to be
assimilated into the collective decision-making processes in BwN
initiatives, because active participation of stakeholders leads to
better and more legitimate decisions (e.g., Fiorino 1990,
Randolph and Bauer 1999, Beierle 2002, Huitema et al. 2009), to
create a shared knowledge base that is perceived as legitimate by
all actors involved.
CONCLUSIONS
We studied the origin of ambiguity in the development process
of projects based on BwN design principles. We investigated the
attributes underlying the frames of the actors that held diverging
views on the issue being framed. Our findings suggest that
ambiguity in multistakeholder decision settings, such as BwN
projects, originates from a contradiction between the beliefs of
the actors involved. Actors occasionally attempt to support their
beliefs with reports and stories of past experiences. However,
whereas knowledge and experiences of the powerful experts seem
to be perceived as legitimate and verifiable, our observations
suggest that knowledge and past experiences of nonexperts,
although these can be very valuable, are not taken into account
in the decision-making process because they are hard to verify.
For instance, we provided examples showing how difficult it was
for nonexperts to provide verifiable evidence that the project
under consideration might have adverse consequences. Moreover,
our observations suggest that the actor positions in terms of
power are currently the most important determinant for how to
cope with ambiguity. These findings suggest that in the current
practice of nature-inclusive flood infrastructure projects,
powerful actors with access to scientific knowledge are privileged
over lay actors with local knowledge and experiences. However,
human interactions can also shape frames and change an actor’s
attributes. Hence, although we have analyzed differences among
the frames of individual actors or a group of actors at a particular
moment in time, future research will benefit from considering the
interactional framing processes through which frames are shaped. 
Carrying on a participatory process could be a promising means
to align diverging beliefs in multiactor project development to
prevent or solve ambiguity (Brugnach and Ingram 2012).
However, our results indicate that, currently, project teams and
experts have a much stronger position than nonexpert actors. For
instance, even though the Safety Buffer case can be characterized
as a participatory process in which stakeholder requirements were
taken into account as much as possible, the project team explicitly
stated that it would make the final decision regarding the
implementation of the initiative. This example points out that
even in cases where stakeholders are actively included in the
participatory process, they are not necessarily granted decisive
influence regarding the action path chosen. This consideration
implies that an important challenge would be to pay more
attention to the rules underlying participatory processes to come
to more democratic knowledge coproduction processes. The
suggested way of doing so is to establish a decision-making setting
in which the debate is open and free among all parties involved
and affected, and all opinions are heard and respected (Richard-
Ferroudji and Barreteau 2012). 
The results of our research demonstrate that it is difficult to bring
the beliefs and past experiences of stakeholders to collective
decision making in nature-inclusive flood management.
Currently, the lay public is regularly invited to all kinds of public
consultation activities, e.g., the public meetings in the Sand Engine
case, but it is rarely included in the knowledge production process
(Lidskog 2008). To come to a scientifically valid, socially robust,
and context-specific knowledge base, different knowledge
sources, i.e., expert and local knowledge, should be integrated in
participatory processes (Hommes et al. 2009). To share power and
responsibility between the government and local stakeholders, it
is a requirement to generate and use knowledge together (Berkes
2009). In an open and transparent participatory process, actors
can gradually develop a set of mutually shared beliefs regarding
ambiguous issues and jointly develop knowledge that is perceived
as legitimate by all those involved. If  such knowledge from
different sources and disciplines is used to define a problem and
identify possible solutions, the final decision is the result of the
interactive process of the group of participating actors instead of
a single rational actor (Brugnach and Ingram 2012). Such
equitable participatory processes, i.e., in which an equifinal set of
interests, moral principles, beliefs, and the required legitimate
knowledge base are developed and used by the actors involved,
are likely to lead to better decisions and increased public support
for promising BwN initiatives.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6416
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Appendix. Example of the method used 
 
In this Appendix, we provide an example of the methods used in our paper. We extensively 
discuss how we built Table 5, concerning the ambiguity about the effects of the Safety Buffer 
nourishment on oyster beds. Regarding this particular ambiguity, the project team and the 
representatives of the oyster sector have different frames. For both actors, we show how we 
identified their frame regarding the Safety Buffer’s effects and the actor attributes associated 
to this frame, by assessing the research questions posed in Table 1 using our research material 
(such as transcripts of interviews and meetings we attended, project documents and even a 
media publication). Table 1 can be found in the Methods section of the paper. Table 5 is 
presented in the Case study II: Safety Buffer Oyster Dam section. 
 
Project team frame and attributes 
 
The project team’s frame regarding the Safety Buffer is that it is an innovative and socially 
acceptable pilot project, that is vital to learn about possibilities for future dike maintenance 
and dealing with the effects of the Sand Hunger. The project team consists of employees of 
the governmental and non-governmental institutions that proposed the Safety Buffer 
initiative. Such institutions initiate and support an initiative if they are convinced of its 
innovative potential and the opportunities it can provide. They would not initiate or support 
an initiative if it is socially unacceptable, e.g. because there is a considerable risk that 
stakeholders will be harmed. More specifically, the project team will not execute the project if 
they frame the Safety Buffer as an unacceptable initiative with regard to the oyster sector. As 
a representative of the municipality were the oyster beds are located remarked: 
 
“We cannot imagine that [the project team] will dump a pile of sand there without looking at the 
consequences. That is not how Rijkswaterstaat works… Rijkswaterstaat [observed] that [problem] with the 
oyster sector. So they immediately indicated: well, we will perform the [sand] mining and nourishment very 
carefully. We will monitor very well. We will [monitor] if there is [damage] or no damage. So I got the 
feeling: they are really on top of it and will not [perform the project] just like that. No, it is really a process 
that has been [done] carefully from the beginning until the end.” 
 
During the meeting of the Safety Buffer knowledge team we attended – several project team 
members are also part of this team – the following statements illustrate how those responsible 
for the Safety Buffer project frame the initiative and the positive intentions they have towards 
the stakeholders: 
 
“[The Safety Buffer] is viewed as a unique project to yield knowledge about the Sand Hunger… We want to 
learn from this… How can I slow down [or] reduce the Sand Hunger with this [concept].” “The fact that 
you create a Safety Buffer at all, with the idea: it extends the maintenance period of such a dike… [By doing 
this project, we can] provide insight about that and make that reasoning transparent. And that is a very 
complicated [issue]… What does [the Safety Buffer concept] mean for [flood] safety?” “If we want to enter 
that [participatory] process with the stakeholders, then we need to be open and say: [stakeholders], how do 
we [feel] and what puts [you] into trouble? Or are their opportunities? How are we going to make 
something out of [this project] that makes everyone stronger?” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the main interest of the project team by answering the 
research question ‘what are the main ambitions or goals of the actor?’. For the project team, 
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we identified that their main interest is to learn about how to improve dike maintenance, while 
simultaneously aiming to improve the Eastern Scheldt estuary’s natural, recreation and user 
quality. We identified this actor attribute from our interviews with those associated with the 
project team. For instance, the following was stated: 
 
“Which interests play a role? It just started, very basically, with [dike] strengthening… [Additionally], we 
would, by [nourishing] sand, do something about the Sand Hunger, restore the natural value to what it was 
20 years ago… And then additionally the combination with some recreation and of course [some benefits 
for] the mussel and oyster sector.” “An important reason why the project team eventually did not choose the 
first design we had, was because we wanted to learn from [the project]… And then we entered in 
discussion: yes, but how do we learn the most?” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the main values of the project team by answering the 
research questions ‘which moral principles does the actor hold as important regarding the 
topic? which criteria or boundary conditions are used to evaluate the topic?’. For the project 
team, we identified that an important value is their social responsibility for the well-being of 
the Eastern Scheldt estuary. Interviewees said the following about this: 
 
“The higher goal. The higher goal: the Eastern Scheldt has to stay well. And we all want to get money out of 
it and enjoy it. But how do we do that?” “We very much want that [the Safety Buffer] is a step in working 
towards a sustainable Eastern Scheldt” “Whoever wants to join should pull up a chair, in order to jointly 
attempt to develop the Eastern Scheldt sustainably.” 
 
An important value of the project team with regard to stakeholders in general – and hence 
with regard to the oyster sector in specific – is that they view it as their responsibility not to 
harm the interests of stakeholders. This value was an explicit boundary condition for the 
design process. During a sounding board meeting on 18 November 2011, this was explicitly 
communicated by a project team representative to all stakeholders present. In the minutes of 
that meeting, the following is reported: 
 
During the development of the final design, the following 4 design criteria will be applied: (1) the users 
[i.e., stakeholders] and functions must not be damaged by either the dredging [i.e., sand mining] or sand 
nourishment… (3) if there is unexpected damage – in contradiction to the scientific insights – then this will 
be compensated according to the common claim settlements. 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the beliefs of the project team by answering the research 
question ‘which propositions or premises does the actor hold to be true regarding the topic 
(even if there is no or contradictory evidence)?’. Regarding the ambiguity about the effects of 
the Safety Buffer on the oyster beds, the project team clearly believes that the project will not 
have adverse effects on shellfish beds. During the sounding board meeting of 20 April 2012, 
which we attended, this belief was explicitly communicated to those present. In the minutes of 
the meeting, it is reported that the risk of damage for the mussel and oyster sector is minor for 
the preferred design alternative. During the interviews, project team members avoided direct 
statements concerning the oyster sector, but the following quote – although an implicit 
statement – clearly supports the belief we identified: 
 
“In [the oyster sector’s] way of thinking, it was about damage and so forth. Because that was their major 
concern: ‘there comes the sand’. Because [the Safety Buffer] was in the center [of the estuary] and of 
course, there are all those oysters. But those are very far away [from the Safety Buffer].” 
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Furthermore, the propositions that the project will not have adverse effects on shellfish beds 
was based on the belief that the judgments of experts involved in the project yield trustworthy 
predictions. We observed that no modeling studies were present among the project 
documentation, which points at the key role of experts in predicting the effects of the project. 
An interviewee remarked the following on this:  
 
“[The design process was done] particularly with expert knowledge. And thus hardly based on data and 
that sort of things or models… I think that [any of the designs] will not really give any trouble for those 
[oyster] beds nearby, as long as some [precautions] are taken. And that has to do with the 
construction…[more than] with the spreading of the sand after [construction].” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the background of the project team by answering the 
research questions ‘which expertise, education or specific knowledge does the actor have 
regarding the topic? is the actor an expert or a layman regarding the topic?’. Several members 
of the project team – some of which we have interviewed – are an employee of 
Rijkswaterstaat, the state water authority of the Netherlands. Obviously, these are individuals 
with extensive expertise and knowledge regarding water management issues in general and 
sand nourishments in specific. Furthermore, an interviewed project team member – who is not 
an employee of Rijkswaterstaat – stated the following: 
 
“[Regarding] the expertise there is [at Rijkswaterstaat] in Middelburg and their commitment…[Currently], 
it is more about contract management…the advanced engineering… Yes, Rijkswaterstaat is just immensely 
experienced with that… My admiration and respect for Rijkswaterstaat has grown [due to this project].” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the experiences of the project team by answering the 
research question ‘from which (personal) historical situations does the actor draw to interpret 
the topic?’. Regarding these experiences, the project team regularly points at the positive 
results of other nourishment pilots in recent years to strengthen their argument and to justify 
the development of the Safety Buffer. For instance, during the interviews, the following was 
stated: 
 
“Then, we were busy with the Sand Hunger Survey in the Eastern Scheldt. And we were looking for the next 
pilots or experiments after the Galgeplaat [and the] Schelphoek [nourishment] pilot. Because those were all 
well on track. But now [we were looking for] something bigger… Galgeplaat went well.” “[The Safety Buffer 
provides the opportunity] to extend the experience that we have gained with sand nourishments in the 
Eastern Scheldt.” 
 
Additionally, the success of previous pilots is often referred to in project documents, such as 
the so-called Execution Plan Safety Buffer Oyster Dam. This plan includes statements about 
the Galgeplaat nourishment, such as: 
 
The results of this small-scale experiment are promising… However, in order to work on the strengthening of 
the tidal flats on a larger scale, [both] more knowledge and pilot projects on a larger scale are required… 
This Safety Buffer Oyster Dam project can contribute regarding this knowledge requirement. 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the actor position of the project team by answering the 
research question ‘what is the societal or political position of the actor regarding the topic 
compared to other relevant actors, in terms of power or influence?’. We uncovered that the 
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actor position of the project team regarding the specific ambiguity we are addressing in this 
Appendix is ambivalent. Although the project team is a powerful actor supported by the 
government, they claim to be unable to overrule the economically vital oyster sector. 
Moreover, this claim was supported by several stakeholders we interviewed. A selection of 
quotes from our interview material illustrates this: 
 
“Could you potentially be able to overrule the shellfish sector?... That will not work. You cannot just 
overrule the shellfish sector. Just to be clear, we don’t even want that.” (interviewed project team actors) “If 
you have that entire sector against you, they can just block such a plan. They have that power.” “If the 
entire oyster sector becomes obstructive, [the project] will get into trouble.” (interviewed stakeholders) 
 
Oyster sector frame and attributes 
 
The oyster sector frame regarding the Safety Buffer project is that it is an unacceptable 
initiative due to its potential adverse impacts on the oyster sector. Nevertheless, the sector 
does acknowledge that the quality of the estuary is degrading due to the Sand Hunger. We 
identified this frame based on the following statements of a representative of the oyster sector 
we interviewed: 
 
“We, [the] Dutch Oyster Association, acknowledge that there is a problem in that Eastern Scheldt, thus that 
there is Sand Hunger… We were absolutely not amused [about the project]; that is obvious… We do not pay 
for it, we didn’t ask for it, we will never ask for it at that spot. We are in fact against [the Safety Buffer] at 
that spot. Because we prefer not to see it [constructed]. Because we do not need it… Why do you have to do 
it exactly where our [oyster]beds are?... There always is a certain risk. So I am convinced that you can 
never give 100% watertight guarantees for the future.” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the main interest of the oyster sector by answering the 
research question ‘what are the main ambitions or goals of the actor?’. The oyster sector is 
represented, both in the Safety Buffer project and in general, by the Dutch Oyster Association 
(in Dutch: Nederlandse Oestervereniging). This organization consists of nearly all 
commercial oyster producers. As the main goal of a common commercial business is to be as 
profitable as possible within reasonable and ethical boundaries, we argue that it is reasonable 
to assume that the main interest driving the oyster sector is maximizing their profit. 
Consequently, the specific concern of the oyster sector regarding the Safety Buffer project is 
that it could endanger their profitability. As the interviewee stated: 
 
“My interest is that there is no damage of course… What if those oyster die?... Then it is a natural disaster, 
they’ll say. Oyster producers: gone!... If it goes wrong here, then you have a significant [financial] loss.” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the main values of the oyster sector by answering the 
research questions ‘which moral principles does the actor hold as important regarding the 
topic? which criteria or boundary conditions are used to evaluate the topic?’. We identified 
that, despite their focus on their own business, both the oyster and mussel sector feel a social 
responsibility for the well-being of the Eastern Scheldt estuary in which they cultivate their 
shellfish. Several interviewees commented on this. For instance, the following was said: 
 
“We, [the] Dutch Oyster Association, acknowledge that there is a problem in that Eastern Scheldt, thus that 
there is Sand Hunger” “On the one hand, [the shellfish sector] constantly says: we commit ourselves, we 
want to contribute to it… But on the other hand, you have to realize that their interest is, of course, rather 
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minor. It is a societal responsibility they feel which they bear there. So that is an interesting position of the 
[shellfish] sector. They have no obligation, it maybe isn’t even in their own interest and nevertheless, they 
still do it… Yes, less tidal flats theoretically [means] more mussel cultivation beds or oyster cultivation 
beds. But they are not into it like that. Fortunately!” “We were able to experience the blessings of the Delta 
Works, in the sense that [those made it possible that] the shellfish culture in Zeeland [still] exists. But [now] 
we are confronted with the side effects. And that is, among others, the Sand Hunger…  So we do not want to 
turn our back to the societal reality of what is going on and that that is experienced as a loss from [a] 
natural point of view.” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the beliefs of the oyster sector by answering the research 
question ‘which propositions or premises does the actor hold to be true regarding the topic 
(even if there is no or contradictory evidence)?’. Regarding the specific ambiguity discussed 
in this Appendix, we identified one essential belief: the Safety Buffer will almost certainly 
have negative effects on the oyster beds. The main representative of the oyster sector sharply 
communicated this belief in an interview with the regional newspaper in May 2011. It was 
actually due to this interview that the ambiguity between the project team and the oyster 
sector surfaced: 
 
If this [nourishment] takes place, that means the deathblow for the [oyster] sector. 
 
Furthermore, the oyster sector representatives expressed similar concerns in a letter sent to the 
members of the Provincial authority in August 2011: 
 
The oyster sector is very worried about the [proposed] nourishment at the Oyster Dam… In case of an excess 
of sand transport, [the oysters] will be covered…and will suffocate. With major anxiety we await the 
execution of the project plan. 
 
During the interviews, the bottom line of the concerns was expressed as follows: 
 
“We are very concerned that, (a) during the sand mining… that sand will enter the oysters, causing the 
oysters to die… and (b) [similarly], at the moment that the sand nourishment has taken place at the Oyster 
Dam.” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the background of the oyster sector by answering the 
research questions ‘which expertise, education or specific knowledge does the actor have 
regarding the topic? is the actor an expert or a layman regarding the topic?’. This attribute was 
partly derived by using common sense. Obviously, both the representatives of the oyster 
sector – i.e., the Dutch Oyster Association – and the commercial oyster companies are not 
experts regarding water management or sand nourishments, as this is not their profession. 
Regarding the background of the oyster sector, our interviewee touched upon this while 
describing the reason of their involvement in the project: 
 
“There are two production sites [in Zeeland]: Lake Grevelingen and the Eastern Scheldt. In the Eastern 
Scheldt, the oyster beds are located in the immediate vicinity of the Oyster Dam… Therefore, we are a 
stakeholder [regarding the Safety Buffer].” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the experiences of the oyster sector by answering the 
research question ‘from which (personal) historical situations does the actor draw to interpret 
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the topic?’. The oyster sector aimed to strengthen their argument by pointing at the negative 
side effects on a mussel bed due to an earlier nourishment pilot. As our interviewee stated: 
 
“Look, the first pilot, so that was on a tidal flat at the Schelphoek. [A pilot] regarding that Sand Hunger. 
Well, [at the Schelphoek], there is some damage at a mussel bed. But that is [just] an incidental damage. 
However, if it goes wrong here [at the Safety Buffer and the oysters are harmed], then you have a 
significant [financial] loss… Yes, so therefore we proposed to raise a damage fund.” 
 
Following Table 1, we identified the actor position of the oyster sector by answering the 
research question ‘what is the societal or political position of the actor regarding the topic 
compared to other relevant actors, in terms of power or influence?’. Similar to the project 
team, the actor position of the oyster sector is ambivalent. The oyster sector has no formal 
power to prevent project implementation, as they do not have the authority to take decisions. 
Nevertheless, because the oyster sector is an economically vital actor, this suggests they have 
a powerful position (as discussed above regarding the actor position of the project team). For 
instance, an interviewed project member stated: 
 
“The oyster sector is really very important for Zeeland… There is big money in that [sector]. And there are 
major interests [attached] to that.” 
 
However, during the interview, the oyster sector representative claimed that his sector does 
not have a powerful actor position and cannot influence the development of the Safety Buffer: 
 
“We, [the oyster sector], are of course a very important party in this whole business… Well, the people I 
represent, they are [against] that sand nourishment… [However], it is fighting windmills… Opposing 
Rijkswaterstaat and the Province, that is too much for me and my 36 [Dutch Oyster Association] members.” 
 
